

CURRICULUM VITAE
David Pensgard
October 2017

Home Address
201 S 29TH ST
Purcellville, VA 20132

Phone: (540) 751 – 9242
Emails: david@pensgard.com
48pensgard@CardinalMail.CUA.edu
drpensgard@Liberty.edu

AREAS OF SPECIALIZATION

German Idealism and Early 19th Century Continental Philosophy (Hegel)
Metaphysics / Ontology

AREAS OF COMPETANCE

Symbolic Logic
Phenomenology (Husserl, Time Consciousness)
Philosophy of Time
Philosophy of Religion (Args. for Existence of God, God and Time)

EDUCATION

- 2018 PhD – Philosophy, School of Philosophy, Catholic University of America.
 Graduation Expected this May.
 Dissertation: *Hegel's Modal Ontological Argument*
 Advisor: Anton Barba-Kay, PhD Univ. of Chicago, under Robert Pippin.
- 2009 MA – Religious Studies, School of Philosophy and Religion, Liberty University.
 Thesis: *Existential Temporality as Fore-Ignorance: Implications for Divine Foreknowledge*
- 1996 BA – Neurobiology/Art Theory and Practice, College of Arts and Sciences,
 Northwestern University, 1996.

ACADEMIC EMPLOYMENT

- 2009-Present Liberty University, College of General Studies, Department of Online Education,
 Instructor in the subject area of Philosophy. Contracts are for 12 classes per year.

PUBLICATIONS

Refereed Journal Articles

- 2006 “Yogacara Buddhism: A Sympathetic Description and Suggestion for Use in Western Theology and Philosophy of Religion.” *Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies* 15: 94-103. <<http://www.jsri.ro>> ISSN 1583-0039.

Theses and Dissertations

- 2018 “Hegel’s Modal Ontological Argument.” PhD Dissertation, School of Philosophy, Catholic University of America, Washington, D. C.
(full drafts available, summary below as supplement to CV)
- 2008 “Existential Temporality as Fore-Ignorance: Implications for Divine Foreknowledge.” MA Thesis, Liberty University, School of Philosophy and Religion, Lynchburg, Virginia, November 2008. < <http://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/masters/27/>>.

AWARDS AND HONORS

- 2009 The Bill Bright Excellence in Scholarship Award. Liberty University, Lynchburg, VA. Given after earning MA.

AREAS OF RESEARCH INTEREST

Hegel in relation to historical philosophies and logical systems, contemporary relevance of Hegel (esp. in relation to contemporary modal logic, ontological arguments, and evolution), metaphysics of time (esp. as it relates to the phenomenology of temporal consciousness), Ontological Arguments, Philosophy of Religion (God and Time)

CONFERENCE PARTICIPATION

- 2014 “Going Beyond Husserl’s Conception of The Structure of Internal Time Consciousness.” 8th Annual Duquesne University Graduate Conference in Philosophy: Philosophy of Time, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. February 2014.
- 2009 “Presentist Time Travel and the Limits of Presentist Causality.” Presented to the *American Philosophical Association* Eastern Division, Philosophy of Time Society Group Meeting, New York City. December 2009.
- 2008 “Existential Temporality as Fore-Ignorance.” Presented at the *Congress of the Humanities and Social Sciences 2008* as part of the *Society for Existential and Phenomenological Theory and Culture* (EPTC/TCEP). University of British Columbia. June 2008.
- 2006 “Memory Considered as an External Source of Knowledge Within an Epistemology of Theological Determinism.” Presented at the *2006 Christian Student Philosophy Conference*. Covenant College, Lookout Mountain, Georgia. April 2006.

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Online Education

Philosophy and Contemporary Ideas, Liberty University, College of General Studies, Department of Online Education. 101 individual courses taught. (2009-Present)

Classroom Education

Guest Lectures (various topics in Philosophy and Religious Studies). Liberty University, School of Philosophy and Religion, Lynchburg, VA. 29 individual lectures given. (2004-2009)

Graphic Design (Levels I, II, III, and IV), William Woods University, School of Art, Fulton, MO. Eight courses taught. (2000-2002)

RESEARCH EXPERIENCE

Research Assistant to Craig A. Evans, Payzant Distinguished Professor of New Testament at Acadia Divinity College of Acadia University, in Wolfville, Nova Scotia, Canada. (2005-2017) I managed materials for his classes online. He is now at another institution, contact information below in Academic References.

Research Assistant to Gary Habermas, Distinguished Professor and Chair of the Department of Philosophy and Theology, Liberty University. (2004-2017) I helped grade papers, lectured in his classes, assisted him in preparing for and attending conference, and consolidated his publications and research for his professional website. Contact information below.

SERVICE TO PROFESSION

Manuscript review for John Douglas Morrison. *Has God Said? Scripture, the Word of God, and the Crisis of Theological Authority*. Volume 5 in the Evangelical Theological Society Monograph Series, David W. Baker, main editor. Eugene, OR: Pickwick Pub., 2006. (work done in 2005)

EXTRACURRICULAR UNIVERSITY ACTIVITIES

Helped establish a chapter of Phi Sigma Tau: International Honor Society in Philosophy, an undergraduate philosophy club. This was done while I was a graduate student at the Department of Philosophy and Theology, Liberty University. Served as an officer 2006-2007.

LANGUAGES

French: Reading/Translating with dictionary

German: Reading/Translating with dictionary

(See "Milestones at CUA" below)

PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIPS & AFFILIATIONS

Philosophy of Time Society. Member since 2007.

Phi Sigma Tau: International Honor Society in Philosophy, Liberty University Chapter, Serving as Vice President. (2006-2007)

ACADEMIC REFERENCES (First Three are Sending Letters of Recommendation)

Antón Barba-Kay (barbakay@cua.edu)
Assistant Professor of Philosophy
School of Philosophy
Aquinas Hall 100
The Catholic University of America
620 Michigan Ave NE
Washington, DC 20064
Phone: (202) 319-5259

Michael Rohlf (rohlf@cua.edu)
Associate Professor of Philosophy
School of Philosophy
Aquinas Hall 100
The Catholic University of America
620 Michigan Ave NE
Washington, DC 20064
Phone: (202) 319-5259

Sean Turchin (saturchin@liberty.edu)
Department Chair, College of General Studies
Associate Professor of Philosophy
College of General Studies
Liberty University
1971 University Blvd
Lynchburg, VA 24515

Gary Habermas (ghabermas@liberty.edu)
Distinguished Professor and Chair of the
Department of Philosophy and Theology
College of General Studies
Liberty University
1971 University Blvd
Lynchburg, VA 24515

Edward Martin (enmartin@liberty.edu)
Associate Professor and Chairman,
Department of Philosophy and Theology
College of General Studies
Liberty University
1971 University Blvd
Lynchburg, VA 24515

Timothy Noone (noonet@cua.edu)
Professor of Philosophy
School of Philosophy
Aquinas Hall 100
The Catholic University of America
620 Michigan Ave NE
Washington, DC 20064
Phone: (202) 319-5259

Thomas Provenzola (tprovencola@liberty.edu)
Associate Professor of Philosophy and Theology
Director of Master of Arts in Religious Studies Program
College of General Studies
Liberty University
1971 University Blvd
Lynchburg, VA 24515

LIST OF GRADUATE COURSES TAKEN

Graduate Classes/ Hours

Total Graduate Classes/Hours: 33/99

PhD Program in Philosophy: Catholic University of America (2010-2013)

Phaedo, Epicureans, and Stoics on Death (Druart)
Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas (Wippel)
Substantial Unity (Mereology) (Gorman)
Aristotle's Categories and On Interpretation (De Groot)
Plotinus / Neoplatonism (Vorwerk)
The Agent of Truth (Phenomenology of the Human Person) (Sokolowski)
Hume's Religion (McCarthy)
Modern German Phil: Leibniz – Dilthey (Zaborowski)
Thought of William of Ockham (Noone)
German Idealism (Rohlf)
Aquinas on Divine Ideas (The Platonic Forms in the Mind of God)(Doolan)
Husserl's Formal and Transcendental Logic (Sokolowski)
Husserl's Cartesian Meditations (Sokolowski)
Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (Rohlf)

Milestones at CUA:

First Comprehensive Exam (1/2): Subject Area: Ancient Philosophy (Fall 2011)
Second Comprehensive Exam (2/2): Subject Area: Contemporary Philosophy (Spring 2013)
Admitted to Candidacy on 08-26-2013 (Fall 2013)
German Translation Exam Completed (Fall 2013)
French Translation Exam Completed (Spring 2016)
Dissertation Proposal Approved by Faculty (Spring 2016)
Dissertation Draft 1 Completed (Spring 2017)
Graduation Scheduled for May 2018

Community Scholar Program: University of Virginia, between MA and PhD (2008-2009)

Metaphysics (Merricks)

Experience (Philosophy of Perception) (Langsam)

MA in Religious Studies: Liberty University (2004-2007)

Kant Seminar (Martin)

Epistemology (Provenzola)

Symbolic Logic (Martin)

Postmodernism/Existentialism (Provenzola)

Eastern Philosophies (Jones)

Metaphysics (Martin)

Kierkegaard Seminar (Hinkson)

Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion (Martin)

Existence of God (Beck)

Mod/Contemp Christian Thought (Morrison)

OT Orientation 1 (Fowler)

NT Orientation 1 (Freerkson)

Introduction to Apologetics (Habermas)

Miracles (Habermas)

Adv. Bibliology (Morrison)

Adv. Christology (Morrison)

Research Methods (Martin/Miller)

SUPPLEMENTS

(The supplements below are suggested by the APA guidelines for CVs.)

Course Evaluation Summary


Abstract and Chapter Summary of Dissertation

SUMMARY OF SELECTED COURSE EVALUATIONS

The following is a digest of recent student evaluations. Full data, 2009-Present, is available or already part of application materials sent.

The chart below summarizes *all data* accumulated 2015-2017 from student evaluations; there are no omissions. This is data for 27 classes. The percentage breakdown of the three categories is 49.4% strongly positive, 42.9% positive, and 7.7% negative.

This is a 92.3% positive rating from students.



Selected Student Comments

“This professor was the best! yet he stuck close to us daily! it was like being in the class!”

“Wonderful professor, worked hard with me to succeed.”

“Knew the subject well” “Very devoted to the class.” “very helpful” “He was excellent.”

“Did a great job on communicating and made the material entertaining while challenging my thinking.”

“You can tell he enjoys helping his students learn. He answers all questions comprehensively, and even took the time to recommend more reading on an area he could tell I was interested in.”

“Insightful thought provoking challenging” “Very encouraging. Thank you!”

“The instructor is personal and willing to help out in any way. His continuous encouragement for students to complete assignments early challenged me. His in depth announcements were also useful in providing clarity in the course.”

“I do not have any recommendations for improvement. This instructor has been very challenging, in a positive manner, as he pushes his students to the highest potential.”

“He was positive and caring.” “provided great feedback”

“I love the comments he provided and the fact that he actually thoroughly looked over our papers and analyzed them.”

“This guy knows his stuff about Philosophy!” “great knowledge of subject”

“Very knowledgeable, this class was fun and enjoyable for me with all that I learned. From the Beginning the let us all know the level of this class how hard we should work at it and what was to be expected he set us up for success from day one”

“He could not be more clear in his instructions. He also is knowledgeable and seems excited about the topics in this course.”

“His feedback and announcements were always detailed and thorough. He was always positive and willing to help with any questions or concerns.”

“Professor Pensgard is a thinker.” “very thorough, wants the best from his students”

“The breakdowns on the paper or written posts were incredibly helpful. He explained exactly where we did well or did poorly, encouraging [me] to improve.”

“He seemed to really want to do his job well.” “feedback on assignments was very specific and helpful”

“Excellent and thoughtful replies to questions, willing to actually engage with the students on points, not merely shuffle over questions.”

“Very quick to respond, and provided feedback needed to improve work. Fair grading and graded in reasonable amount of time. Emails always were encouraging and provided appropriate feedback.”

“Responsive communication. Provided good constructive feedback on assignments.”

“the faculty member was always willing to give good advice that help me study better and gave good inspiration talks that I will be using in my studies”

“Instructor provided great feedback for essays and discussion boards and was very considerate when I had an issue”

“Was very effective in grading assignments on time and communicating to the students.”

“All the assignments were graded quickly, so I knew what I needed to improve. The professor gave advice on how to improve my quality of work.”

“Communicates very well!!” “Very experienced” “Encouraging and helpful”

“Clear with instructions. Gave very detailed explanations. Gave helpful responses to questions.”

“Clear and precise, responded when needed assistance” “Knowledgeable”

“The professor was very encouraging and kept me on my toes the entire class. He continually reminded us of the importance of staying ahead because of the difficulty of the course material.”

“Helped me to engage the world from a philosophical prospective.”

“Inspiring, encouraging” “He likes explaining things. In general he is the best”

Note: Complete data from the evaluations for all 101 classes is available.

DISSERTATION ABSTRACT AND CHAPTER SUMMARIES

Hegel's ontological argument is the key to interpreting his entire philosophy. It is, in fact, the interpretational framework that Hegel himself has provided. Without understanding this argument, Hegel's philosophy is hopelessly inaccessible. The topic at hand is therefore no tangential or minor issue for Hegel scholarship, which after nearly 200 years of interpretative efforts is still attempting to settle what Hegel's philosophy is even about.

There are two aspects of Hegel's understanding of ontological argumentation that are likely to be unexpected. First, to Hegel, ontological argumentation is a broad category of argument, and so his analysis and use of such arguments is not limited to a medieval Christian context or to the existence of God. Instead, such argumentation seeks to unify all possible conceptual and physical worlds under a higher category, the Absolute Idea. Moreover, it is by means of this unification, and by the ruling out of anything external to this Absolute, that Hegel means to ground knowledge. Therefore, the Ontological Argument, to Hegel, is a means of grounding knowledge philosophically rather than proving a theological principle.

Second, Hegel's own ontological argument is a true and unmitigated syllogism. Contrary to the expectations of virtually every Hegel scholar today, this argument is not a discursive or "dialectic" alternative that Hegel paradoxically describes with traditional terminology (e. g., "syllogism," "deduction," "demonstration," "proof," etc.), but it is the same kind of logical entity that was conceived first by Aristotle and developed by the Stoics, the Scholastics, Ockham, and Leibniz to name but a few. Hegel shows evidence of a deep understanding of all of these logicians, and even though he gave a thorough critique of traditional, formal logic, his subsequent development of the science of logic was not meant to overwrite or cancel past advancements in the field.

Hegel's criticisms of the traditional, dogmatic metaphysics and logic focused on two problems that he worked to overcome: presupposition and finitude. Presupposition is overcome when the rules, tools, and contents used by a logician are grounded, connected, and derived within a self-supporting system. Finitude (or isolation of concepts from one another and from their objects) is overcome when concepts are connected to one another and to their objects. Hegel's philosophy provides remedies for these problems, which means that Hegel was able to overcome the source of the dogmatism that he believed had plagued the traditional systems of logic from Aristotle to Leibniz.

Most interpreters of Hegel have made the decision to rule out the possibility that Hegel's philosophy could make use of syllogistic reasoning. However, this presumes an understanding of Hegel's philosophy that remains, even today, unsettled. If this surmise depends on what Hegel's philosophy is seeking to accomplish and if interpreters are still attempting to establish what Hegel's philosophy is about, then this common belief ought not be placed beyond suspicion. Perhaps this near-universal belief that Hegel abandons and replaces traditional logic does not amount to question-begging, but even if it does not, it is insufficient to forbid a new investigation. It should be open to new evidence. We must therefore ask anew whether Hegel really meant to reject and replace formal logic. If a good case can be made that he meant to repair the traditional approach to logic instead of abandon it, and if a coherent philosophy can be detected in light of this alternative, or even because of it, then the investigation should be worth the effort.

With this and other arguments, and with much textual exegesis, my dissertation works to establish the legitimacy of reading Hegel as a logician capable of using advanced syllogistics. I then collect evidence from Hegel's writings, primarily the *Encyclopedia Logic*, showing that Hegel's ontological argument both exists—he does have his own argument—and that it can be reconstructed and tested as a modal disjunctive syllogism. Only when this is done can Hegel's system be understood and appraised.

Chapter Summaries

Chapter I has two main parts, a listing of factors that might obscure our view of Hegel's argument as a preparation for exegesis, and second, the textual analysis itself.

Regarding the first part, it is difficult to find and analyze Hegel's ontological argument because several factors obscure it from detection: its lack of a formalized presentation; the subtlety of the primary text; and its similarity with another well-known Hegelian argument, the Absolute Identity Thesis.

With regard to the lack of a formalized presentation, Hegel's own ontological argument is not presented with the now-expected signs of formal deduction. The numbered lines, the explicit stating of standardized rules of inference, the special symbols, and the expected verbal signs of well-worn classes of inferences are all missing. Hegel does his syllogizing without such signposts. Yet, most of these signs were established after Hegel's lifetime. Thus, to expect such indicators would be inappropriate. A reader must learn to see deductions without such aids.

The second reason that Hegel's ontological argument has been difficult to identify is that his most clear and direct text on the subject, the *Lectures on the Proofs of the Existence of God*, does not present his own argument in a straightforward manner. It appears only to address past versions of the argument. After this, there is no separate presentation of his own argument as such. For this reason, many conclude that he has no argument of his own. My contention, in response, is that the analysis as a whole represents his argument and that its ability to incorporate past forms of thought in distinct stages is itself evidence of his intentions to produce his own argument in the form of a disjunctive syllogism.

Specifically, his presentation and rejection of stage-one arguments (Anselm, for example) and then stage-two arguments (Descartes, for example) align with the negated premises of a disjunctive argument of the following form: $\sim(\sim A)$; $\sim(A \vee \sim A)$; (A) . This is no doubt cryptic at first glance. To briefly clarify, option A represents Hegel's own position. The first category of ontological arguments (Anselm) rejects A. Anselm, therefore, posits $\sim A$. Hegel rejects the rejection by negating it a second time: $\sim(\sim A)$. This brings Anselm into line with Hegel's position: $\sim(\sim A) = A$. The same process repeats for the second category of ontological arguments (Descartes). This group doubts A, and is thus unsure if A is true or not. This is represented by $(A \vee \sim A)$. Hegel rejects and negates this as well: $\sim(A \vee \sim A)$. To make this align with A, however, it must be read in the following way: "It is not the case that it is *merely* possible that A or not A is the case." The reason is that Hegel thinks of his conclusion as necessary. The mere possibility of A must be negated due to the necessity of A. In this way, the first two historical stages align with the first negated stages of a disjunctive syllogism. Hegel's own position, A, is the third premise, and this is represented by the entire argument, but also the entire lecture including its analysis of past forms of ontological argument. That is, the analysis itself is an argument that takes this form: not category 1, not category 2, therefore category 3. The analysis itself is category 3, Hegel's position.

The third reason that Hegel's ontological argument is often missed is that it is inappropriately distinguished from his absolute identity thesis. This thesis is understood to be the core engine of his entire philosophy even though its purpose is not yet agreed upon. My position is that Hegel's absolute identity thesis is his ontological argument. They are the same argument. If this is true, then the goals and methods that are seen in his ontological argument can serve as aids in interpreting his absolute identity thesis, which is to say, his entire philosophy. Not only does this realization allow for his ontological argument to be identified in many other texts, but it drives interpretation of Hegel's entire philosophy toward a definitive conclusion. This may help to overcome the contemporary impasse in Hegel scholarship.

Two texts will then be explored in depth in the search for clues and "raw data" for Hegel's argument: the lecture just mentioned and the *Encyclopedia Logic*. This is the bulk of the chapter.

Chapter II attempts to support the conclusion from the raw data of textual analysis that seems to indicate Hegel delivers an unmitigated disjunctive syllogism as the final form of his ontological argument and philosophical system. This is pursued by reviewing the reasons for the expectations that Hegel could not have, or did not wish to, preserve formal logic as it had come up to him, most recently, through Leibniz and Wolff. Evidence for the advanced state of formal logic at that time is presented along with its paradoxical unpopularity and progressive loss. This is followed by evidence that Hegel had a very advanced understanding of formal logic himself. With this background, Hegel's critique of formal logic is explored in depth. As mentioned above, it will be shown that his primary accusations against the likes of Aristotle are that they succumb to the errors of presupposition and finitude. In other terms, they presuppose the abstractness of concepts that they use to do logic and this results in unavoidable dogmatism. Hegel's solution, however, does not destroy the syllogism; it merely uncovers the shroud of dogmatism by connecting concepts together and demonstrating that they can be their own ground. This overcomes presupposition by means of demonstration, and it overcomes finitude (isolation) by means of interconnectedness. The chapter goes on to discuss several implications of this result and interacts with some of the relevant literature.

Chapter III gets deeper into the logical form that Hegel uses in "both" his ontological argument and absolute identity thesis. This form, the Disjunctive Syllogism, is derived at great pains by Hegel in the *Logics*. This is traced at a sufficient level of detail and some interaction with helpful resources guides the way.

After its derivation is fully described, the properties, position, and function of the Disjunctive Syllogism are discussed next. It behaves for Hegel as a mediator of concept and being. Yet this syllogism is itself a concept. Consequently, it acts as the mediator of itself with its own object. And, its object is itself. It is thus able to unify its contents with its form, the first of the forms of thought to be able to accomplish this feat. Hegel states plainly that the sole activity of thought is to think itself. The Disjunctive Syllogism, therefore is the preeminent form of this activity.

One final characteristic of this form of syllogism is then described to close the chapter, its inherent modality. Not only does the Disjunctive Syllogism include within its disjunctive judgment ($A \vee \sim A$) a reference to possibility, but the largest context in which Hegel applies this syllogism is absolute, implying that the other premises must involve necessity. Thus, the possibility of the above premise and the

necessity of the others (one negated the other demonstrated) is shown to be implicit. The result is therefore a modal disjunctive syllogism:

$$\sim(\Box\sim A); \sim\Diamond(A \vee \sim A); \Box(A)$$

Chapter IV delves more deeply into the complete modal syllogism as such. I spend much time exploring a similar neo-Hegelian argument from Vittorio Hösle and interact with several of those who have analyzed his argument. I use this argument for comparison as I construct a proof of the Hegelian ontological argument that I have drawn directly from Hegel's own words. This reconstruction and proof establishes the validity of Hegel's ontological argument if certain allowances are made. These allowances are discussed. At the end of the chapter, I also consider the argument's soundness and find it, in the end, lacking something important. I then suggest a way forward for the argument as my conclusion.

Please note: full but early drafts and additional samples from the dissertation are currently available upon request.